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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Through a focus on the ever increasing need to address information asymmetries, as well as 
reference to the uniqueness of the degree to which systemic risks are triggered in banking, this 
paper aims primarily to highlight reasons why government and central bank intervention are 
essential and required in financial regulation. 
 
The  role  presently  assumed  by  regulation  is  not  the  same  as  it  was  thirty  years  ago. 
Deregulation and conglomeration have significantly altered the landscape in which regulation 
previously existed and to an extent, defined the role which it presently assumes. For this 
reason, arguments which were (and have been) directed against government, central bank 
intervention, as well as the role of regulation, require re-evaluation. 
 
Deposit  insurance  and  lender  of  last  resort  arrangements  serve  to  instil  confidence  in 
depositors   hence   contributing   towards   safeguarding   system   stability   and   preventing 
unnecessary runs where  panics occur. Such benefits are not only considered against those 
arguments   advanced   by   antagonists   of   deposit   insurance   and   lender   of   last   resort 
arrangements, but also against those views which do not favour government and central bank 
intervention. In evaluating whether free banking is equipped with as many mechanisms and 
safeguards required in safeguarding the stability of the financial system, the urgency for such 
safety net instruments, which is attributed to the peculiar and unique nature of banking, will 
be  considered. Contrary to the argument [that “if markets are generally better at allocating 
resources than governments are, then the differences or distinctions which exist between 
“money”and the industry that provides it (the banking industry) should not serve as bases for 
an assumption that money and banking are exceptions to the general rule”], it has to be 
highlighted (for several reasons) that the banking industry could not be equated to other areas 
of the financial sector. One of such reasons relates to the extent to which the impact of 
systemic runs differ within the banking sector when compared to other areas such as the 
securities markets. 
 
The differences in the nature of risks which exist in banking and those which exist within the 
securities markets, constitutes another reason why the need for government and central bank 
intervention is advocated.  Furthermore, even though the nature of banking risks warrants 
government and central bank intervention –  as well as capital adequacy regulation, capital 
regulation should also be extended to the securities markets for many reasons – one of which 
is the ability to securitise assets. 
 
If there was no longer a role for regulation, then re- regulation should not have occurred in 
certain   jurisdictions   which   have   adopted   and   successfully   implemented   consolidated 
supervision. 
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Introduction 
 
„Government failure does not constitute a good argument for government intervention“2    - 
however  information asymmetry and the degree of interconnectivity associated with some 
parts of the financial system merit such intervention. This being particularly the case where 
systemic risks which are consequential of information asymmetry involve “too big to fail” or 
“too interconnected to fail” firms. Moral hazard, a  market failure which is associated with 
asymmetric information – as well as high levels of deposit insurance and lender of last resort 
arrangements,  is  defined  as  “  a  situation  whereby  asymmetric  information  could  induce 
borrowers to take action/s which erode the value of loans.”3    Moral hazard could also be 
defined as adverse incentive effects – such as excessive risk taking levels, and the tendency 
for depositors to be less careful in the selection of their banks. 
 
Forms of government and central bank intervention, such as deposit insurance schemes and 
lender of last resort arrangements, have been criticised for their capacity to induce higher risk 
taking levels than would otherwise have existed if such arrangements had not been in place. 
The existence of high levels of deposit insurance is also considered to serve as an incentive 
which compels banks to retain lower levels of capital.  However a distinction needs to be 
drawn between the need for safety net mechanisms (such as deposit insurance and lender of 
last resort arrangements) and excessive or unduly high levels of deposit insurance  and  the 
provision of lender of last resort mechanisms to those banks who do not necessarily merit 
such intervention. 
 
The role assumed by banks, that is, their continual monitoring of the creditworthiness of the 
borrower and their duty to ensure due diligence (from the start of the contract and throughout 
the  monitoring  process),  not  only  enables  and  equips  banks  to  “acquire  and  evaluate 
information about potential borrowers”, but also contributes to their capacity to reduce costs 
which  are linked to moral hazard  – since banks are  considered  to be more  effective  at 
monitoring the behaviour of borrowers after funds have been distributed.4 
 
Capital adequacy regulation, another form of government intervention – which could also be 
regarded as  signifying a move towards free banking (hence embodying a combination of 
government intervention and free banking), has also faced growing criticisms recently. Basel 
II has been criticised for its unduly and over sensitive internal credit risk models which have 
contributed towards inducing further pro cyclical effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
1Visiting Scholar,University of Heidelberg; Legal Scholarship Network Email:marianneojo@hotmail.com 
2K Dowd, „Does Asymmetric Information Justify Bank Capital Adequacy Regulation?“ Cato Journal, Vol. 19, 
No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1999) at page 9 
3  
JC Trichet, „What Role For Finance“University lecture by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European 
Central Bank, at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, 6 May 2010 at page 3 of 9 < 
http://www.bis.org/review/r100510a.pdf> 
4  see ibid at pages 2 and 4 
Whilst the rationale for bank regulation has been questioned and has constituted the topic of 
various debates, the securitisation of loans and its effects in “reducing lenders’ incentives to 
undertake prudent screening and  continuous monitoring”5    constitutes a further reason for 
capital adequacy regulation to be extended to the securities markets. 
 
The first section of the paper aims to enlighten, as well as bring to recollection, some of those 
arguments which have supported or criticised the rationale for safety instruments such as 
deposit insurance schemes and lender of last resort arrangements. In defending the rationale 
for such safety net instruments, the need to  have an appropriate level of such safety net 
instruments (as opposed to excessive levels) operating in the financial system is re-iterated. 
Furthermore,  the  role  played  by  central  banks  and  governments  in  facilitating  financial 
stability and supervision, as well as the inability of free banking mechanisms to  provide 
similarly effective attributes, constitute further reasons why central bank and government 
intervention is advocated. 
 
The  second  section  considers  how  capital  adequacy  requirements,  another  form  of  state 
intervention,   has   contributed   towards   addressing   problems   attributed   to   information 
asymmetries. However, it is highlighted that this proposal and measure only serves as a partial 
solution to the issue of asymmetric information. This was not only demonstrated during the 
most recent financial crisis, but has been realised over the past years – resulting in the Basel 
Committee’s initiatives and introduction of the three pillar system which is still relevant for 
the  Revised  Framework  for  the  International  Convergence  of  Capital  Measurement  and 
Capital Standards: namely, capital adequacy requirements, supervisory review and market 
discipline. 
 
The third section then considers reasons advanced in favour of and against free banking. 
Section four not only provides an analysis of reasons why central bank intervention is deemed 
necessary in regulation but also considers the benefits and detriments which are attributed to 
central banks’ assumption of all encompassing roles of supervisor, monetary policy setter and 
lender of last resort. Even though the option of government owned central banks is accepted 
by Benston and Kaufman, the possibility that private central banks could serve as a better 
option to government owned central banks is not excluded.6 
 
For reasons  not  only  attributed  to  accountability,  but  also  the  possibilities  that  political 
interference in central bank decision making might occur, private central banks are preferred. 
Furthermore, it is important for central banks to become more independent in the conduct of 
monetary policy procedures and less politically involved when assuming supervisory roles. 
However, central bank independence will not constitute a topic of detailed discussion in the 
present paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5   Even though Trichet also argues that stock markets can perform the duty of monitoring the behaviour of 
borrowers – thereby contributing towards the reduction of moral hazard, he acknowledges the difficulties (in 
monitoring) which arise where loan securitisation occurs. See ibid at pages 2 and 4. Also see DW Diamond and 
RE Verrechia “Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security prices” (1982) Journal of Finance, 
Volume 37 at pages 275 – 287 and M Jensen and K Murphy “Performance Pay and Top Management 
Incentives” Journal of Political Economy Volume 98 at pages 225 - 263. 
6   See GJ Benston and GG Kaufman „The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation“(1996) Economic Journal 
Volume 106 (May) at page 696. 
 A. Forms of Government and Central Bank Intervention in Bank Regulation. 
I. Deposit Insurance and Lender of Last Resort Arrangements: 
Deposit  insurance  and  lender  of  last  resort  arrangements  serve  to  instil  confidence  in 
depositors   hence   contributing   towards   safeguarding   system   stability   and   preventing 
unnecessary runs where  panics occur. Such benefits are not only considered against those 
arguments   advanced   by   antagonists   of   deposit   insurance   and   lender   of   last   resort 
arrangements, but also against those views which do not favour government and central bank 
intervention. In evaluating whether free banking is equipped with as many mechanisms and 
safeguards required in safeguarding the stability of the financial system, the urgency for such 
safety net instruments which is attributed to the peculiar and unique nature of banking will be 
considered. 
 
Furthermore, the differences in the nature of risks which exist in banking and those which 
exist within the securities markets, constitutes another reason for the need for government and 
central bank intervention. Even though the nature of banking risks warrants government and 
central bank intervention – as well as capital adequacy regulation, capital regulation should 
also be extended to the securities markets for many reasons – one of which is the ability to 
securitise assets. 
 
The rationale for bank regulation in the form of safety instrument arrangements for consumers 
(deposit  insurance)  and banks (lender of last resort arrangements) and whether such safety 
instruments actually contribute to the development of the banking system have constituted the 
subjects of controversial debates in several sources of the literature. 
 
Criticism has been directed at the rationale for having banking regulation in the public sector 
– in particular, to high levels of deposit insurance.7   According to Dowd, the Lender of Last 
Resort support  to the financial system “directly encourages the very behaviour”, that is, 
“greater risk-taking and weaker  capital positions – which a sound banking regime should 
avoid.”8 This being the case since (in his opinion), the availability of the lender of last resort 
arrangement would always encourage a situation where bad banks are protected from the 
consequences of their “own” actions (as the mechanism is intended to be a source of liquidity 
to banks which cannot otherwise obtain such liquidity) and since “good” banks will always 
have access to loans which are required to sustain their liquidity levels.9 
 
In serving as a kind of life-line to weaker banks, the lender of last resort facility, it is further 
contended, has the potential to i) “reduce incentives for good banks to adopt the virtuous 
strategy of building themselves up in anticipation of winning weaker banks’ market share”, as 
well as ii) stimulating the incentives of “otherwise good” banks, under these circumstances, to 
take on greater risks.10 
 
 
 
7   See JS Alworth and S Bhattacharya, Paper presented at the 32nd Annual Conference on Bank Structure 
and Competition , sections 1 and 3.2 
8   K Dowd, „The Case For Financial Laissez-Faire“May 1996 The Economic Journal Volume 106 at page 683 
9  ibid 
10   Dowd argues that the lender of last resort facility, ironically, could trigger the very instability which supporters 
of central banking often claim could arise under free banking and that furthermore, anyone observing such 
instability could easily and erroneously consider it to be a consequence of market activities – as well as falsely 
believing that the banking system actually required the LLR mechanism (which in actual fact, was undermining 
it). ibid 
Furthermore, the capacity of deposit insurance to serve as an impediment to forces of market 
discipline has been highlighted. In illustrating its impact on market discipline, Kaufman states 
that the substantial and easily  relatively reduced losses to bank depositors, federal deposit 
insurance corporation, loan customers and users  of the payments system – as well as the 
reduction  in  levels  of  bank  failures  (generally),  may  result  in  the  potential  for  “even 
temporary disruptions in either bank-loan customer relations or the payments system (through 
increasing capital requirements and enforcing prompt regulatory corrective intervention and 
least cost resolution provisions).”11  He also adds that federal deposit insurance requires the 
application of additional special legislation and regulation to banking and that banking, as a 
result, is unique – not solely because of its potential to trigger systemic contagion, but also 
because  of  federal  deposit  insurance.12   It is  also  argued  that  in  the  absence  of  deposit 
insurance guarantees, banks which recognise risks which are attributable to transaction costs 
and asymmetrical information discounts (such transaction costs and information asymmetry 
having  the  capacity  to  contribute  to  costs  for  banks  that  have  experienced  large  scale 
withdrawals - which might result in insolvency for such banks) and are able to provide for 
these risks  through the retention of adequate amounts of capital – to prevent simultaneous 
withdrawal of funds by depositors, are unlikely to be penalised by the market (whilst banks 
which do not recognise or make provision for such risks are likely to be penalised).13 
 
Other  ways  through  which  market  discipline  could  be  impeded  include  “the  aggressive 
expansion of central banks’ balance sheets – which may serve as substitute for markets for 
longer than intended.”14  In elaborating on this point, it is further argued, that central banks 
could impair the operation of the money  market if they were to drain the supply of high 
quality collateral required by market participants and that as a result, “central banks need to 
 
11   “Such provisions”, in Kaufman’s opinion, “attempt to mimic forces of market discipline in an insured 
depositor environment.” GG Kaufman “Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence” Journal of 
Financial Services Research Volume 8 No 2 at page 143 and 144; Also see GJ Benston, and GG Kaufman, Risk 
and Solvency Regulation of Depository Institutions. Past Policies and Current Options. New York: Salomon 
Brothers Center Graduate School of Business, New York University. 1988. 
12   GG Kaufman “Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence” Journal of Financial Services 
Research Volume 8 No 2 at page 143; Based on various hypotheses on the literature, industry and firm specific 
contagion (whether individual or in association with one another), are considered more likely to occur in banking 
owing to the fact that depositors are generally considered to be less informed about the financial state of both 
their own banks and those of other banks in the industry than creditors of firms in non bank industries. This is 
attributed to a number of reasons, namely: 
“One, many depositors have only small claims and thus find credit evaluation of individual institutions relatively 
costly. Two, many bank assets, liabilities, and activities are considered to be unique and not have readily 
marketable counterparts, and some bank activities are cloaked in confidentiality so that information is scarce. As 
a result, valuing these activities at market is likely to be more difficult and less accurate for banks than for non 
banking firms, and depositors are assumed to view banks as more or less homogeneous with respect to their 
financial health. Three, because the market values of these activities can change quickly, costly frequent and 
possibly even continuous monitoring is required to differentiate adequately among institutions. Four, product and 
market differences are hypothesized to be less important than in other industries, particularly since the 
introduction of federal deposit insurance, so that banks are viewed as being more homogeneous.” See GG 
Kaufman “Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence” Journal of Financial Services Research 
Volume 8 No 2 at page 127; also see CW Calomoris and G Gorton, “The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, 
Facts and Bank Regulation” in GR Hubbard ed Financial Markets and Financial Crises (1991) Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press at pages 109-173; FS Mishkin, "Asymmetric Information and Financial Crisis: A 
Historical Perspective." In R. Glenn Hubbard, ed., Financial Markets" and Financial Crises. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1991, pp.69- 108.RE Randall, "The Need to Protect Depositors at Large Banks, and 
the Implications for Bank Powers and Ownership," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, September;/October I990, pp. 63-75. 
13   GJ Benston and GG Kaufman „The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation“ (1996) Economic Journal Volume 
106 (May) at page 692 
14   J Caruana, “The Great Financial Crisis: Lessons For the Design of Central Banks” 2010 Bank for International 
Settlements Publications at page 2 of 9 
strike a balance between the need to protect their financial position and the broader policy 
objective of making markets work.”15 
 
 
 
II. Empirical Evidence Which Suggest that Banking is Only Slightly Unique. 
 
Although it is argued that “a review of the empirical literature reveals very little support for 
the claim that depositor runs on solvent banks cause insolvencies” (Kaufman, I984)16, it is 
generally acknowledged that the impact of contagion and failure is more serious within the 
banking industry than other industries. As well as examining reasons why bank contagion and 
failure  are  considered  to  be  more  serious  in  the  banking  industry,  Kaufman  evaluates 
empirical evidence which he used as a means of investigating why such  contagion “occurs 
faster, spreads more broadly within the banking industry, results in larger number of failures, 
results in larger losses to creditors (depositors) at failed banks and spreads more beyond the 
banking industry – causing damage to the financial system as a whole.”17  He concludes that 
“bank failures with no or only minimal losses to depositors and no interruptions in lending 
arrangements or the payments system are neither more contagious nor more damaging than 
the failures of non bank firms.”18 
 
 
 
B. Capital Adequacy Regulation: A Hybrid of State Intervention and Free Banking 
 
Another form of government or central bank intervention other than the above mentioned, as 
argued by David Miles19, is namely capital adequacy regulation. This form of intervention is 
intended to “compel banks to retain higher levels of capital than they otherwise would.”20 The 
adoption of capital adequacy ratios is also considered to signify a move which is evidential of 
free banking since the expansion of banks' credit requires the fulfilment of criteria aimed at 
demonstrating that such credit expansion is required.21    The explanation to  Miles argument 
(that capital adequacy serves to induce banks to retain higher capital levels), as stated by 
Dowd,  consists  in  the  fact  that  “if  depositors  cannot  assess  the  financial  soundness  of 
individual banks, then banks will maintain lower than optimal capital ratios .”22  Miles argues 
that a solution to such problem triggered by information asymmetry could be for a regulator 
 
 
 
 
15   “Private financial institutions will prefer counter parties of unquestioned soundness during periods of financial 
crisis and it may prove difficult to control the dependency of such private financial institutions on the central 
bank”; ibid at pages 2 and 3. 
16   GJ Benston and GG Kaufman „The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation“ (1996) Economic Journal Volume 
106 (May) at page 692 
17   GG Kaufman “Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence” Journal of Financial Services 
Research Volume 8 No 2 at page 124 
18   ibid at page 144 
19   K Dowd, „Does Asymmetric Information Justify Bank Capital Adequacy Regulation?“ 
Cato Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1999) at page 2 
20   ibid 
21Furthermore, Dow adds that the market has demonstrated a lack of responsiveness (as well as lack of ability to 
predict with accuracy, the consequences of increased sovereign debt) in relation to very obvious implications of 
debt crisis. That free banking enthusiasts might argue that such „sluggishness“ in response is attributable to the 
sense of security provided by the State. See S Dow, “Why the Banking Industry Should Be Regulated?” May 
1996 Volume 106 No 436 The Economic Journal at page 702 
22   In this respect, the optimal capital ratios are regarded as ”those ratios which the banks would have observed if 
the depositors had been able to assess their financial positions adequately and properly.” See K Dowd, „Does 
Asymmetric Information Justify Bank Capital Adequacy Regulation?“ Cato Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 
(Spring/Summer 1999) at page 2 
to “assess the level of capital which the bank would have retained in the absence of such 
information asymmetry and compel it to retain this level of capital.”23 
 
Such a possibility for the regulator to asses the level of capital which the bank would have 
retained (given no existence of information asymmetry), in Dowd’s view, should also provide 
depositors with the capacity to obtain sufficient information in order to assess banks’ capital 
adequacy – with the resulting consequence that regulation would not be necessary.24  Dowd’s 
view however, raises two contentious points: 
 
i)Whether and when it would be appropriate to provide depositors with information obtained 
by the regulator. Not all depositors are able to distinguish appropriately between those banks 
which are truly and likely to fail  and the premature release of financially sensitive bank 
information may trigger a bank run – even before the central bank is able to perform its role 
as lender of last resort. 
 
ii) There will always be a role for regulation – since capital adequacy requirements on their 
own, would still not suffice to address problems attributed to information asymmetry. 
 
 
 
The impact of the failure of one bank or a small group of banks is illustrated through the 
effects of rapid deposit withdrawals and the fears which as a result, could be instilled in the 
“most trusting bank customer” as a result of such withdrawals.25  Little evidence, it is further 
added, exists to support the general belief that  bank contagion could trigger domino like 
effects which could result in the failure of solvent banks, the financial system, and even the 
entire macro economic system – even in the absence of deposit insurance.26 
 
According to Benston and Kaufman, the possibility of solvent banks being rendered insolvent 
is likely to occur where costs are imposed on such solvent banks (which have been subjected 
to  massive  withdrawals),  as  a  result  of  transaction  costs  and  asymmetric  information 
discounts.27  Furthermore, they argue that short - term depositors of both solvent or insolvent 
banks have the capacity to withdraw all their money at the same time only if their banks are 
able to sell necessary assets or secure required funds quickly.28 
 
 
 
Even though Dowd argues that safety net instruments have weakened the banking system and 
that during a period where unregulated systems existed, banks with strong capital positions 
retained depositor confidence,  such an argument does not take into due consideration, the 
problem of asymmetric information. In acknowledging Miles’ argument, Dowd admits that 
regulators  could  play  a  role  by  imposing  capital   requirements  which  would  address 
asymmetric  information.29      Even  then,  Miles’  proposal  would  not   address  asymmetric 
 
23  ibid 
24  ibid at page 8 
25   
Such need and ability of depositors to take rapid protection is explained by way of the short term nature of 
deposits – which as a result, instigates depositors to take protection actions aimed at ensuring a safe (rather than 
sorry) position. See GG Kaufman “Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence” Journal of Financial 
Services Research Volume 8 No 2 at page 127 
26  ibid at page 143 
27   See GJ Benston and GG Kaufman „The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation“ (1996) Economic 
JournalVolume 106 (May) at page 692 
28  ibid 
29   Information asymmetry, as argued by Dowd, leads to a bank capital adequacy problem. “Miles’ solution is for 
a regulator to assess the level of capital the bank would have maintained in the absence of the information 
asymmetry, and then force it to maintain this level of capital. If depositors cannot assess the financial soundness 
information in its entirety. If banks were compelled by regulators to retain such levels of 
capital that would have been retained if asymmetric information did not exist (and if the 
depositors had been able to asses their financial positions with sufficient transparency),30  this 
would not necessarily guarantee  depositor  confidence.  Liquidity risks and systemic  risks 
triggered as a result of asymmetric information justify the  fact that regulation will still be 
required even where adequate capital cushions appear to exist – since such cushions on their 
own,  are  not  adequate  enough  to  combat  liquidity,  systemic  risks  and  bank  runs  which 
eventually  result  in  genuine  market  failures  within  the  financial  system.  As  well  as 
constituting  a   fundamental  foundation  of  prudential  supervision,  the  Basel  Committee 
recognised the inability of capital  adequacy requirements to thrive efficiently on its own – 
thereby creating two other complementary pillars,  namely, supervisory review and market 
discipline. Even though banks’ strong capital positions serve (to an extent) as a formidable 
means  of  addressing  asymmetric  information,  not  all  market  failures  resulting   from 
asymmetric information will be addressed. Furthermore, deposit insurance and lender of last 
resort   arrangements,  if  administered  according  to  levels  which  are  not  excessive  or 
unwarranted, will certainly help to contribute some degree of stability to the financial system 
where  depositors  and  banks  are  offered  some  form of  assurance  which  would  limit  the 
occurrence of bank failures or bank runs. 
 
 
 
 
C. Arguments in Favour of and against Free Banking 
 
Free banking  is  favoured  by  Dowd  who  argues  that  if  markets  are  generally  better  at 
allocating  resources than governments are, then the differences or distinctions which exist 
between “money” and the industry that provides it (the banking industry) should not serve as 
bases for an assumption that money and banking are exceptions to the general rule.31 
 
Whilst Dowd is in favour of free banking, Dow advances many reasons to justify her support 
for the restriction of regulation to deposit insurance and the “generalised provision of lender- 
of-last-resort” arrangements to the entire system.32 
 
Arguments against Free Banking 
 
2 principal arguments advanced by Dow, which could be considered as reasons attributed to 
the need for government and central bank intervention are as follows:33 
 
 
of individual banks, then banks will maintain lower than optimal capital ratios, where the optimal capital ratios 
are those banks would have observed if depositors could have assessed their financial positions properly. 
Intuitively, if depositors can assess a bank’s capital strength, a bank will maintain a relatively strong capital 
position because greater capital induces depositors to accept lower interest rates on their deposits. However, if 
depositors cannot assess a bank’s capital strength, then a bank can no longer induce depositors to accept lower 
interest rates in return for higher capital, and the bank’s privately optimal capital ratio is lower than is socially 
optimal.” K Dowd, „Does Asymmetric Information Justify Bank Capital Adequacy Regulation?“ Cato Journal, 
Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1999) at page 2 of 9 
30   The levels that would have been retained are “the optimal capital ratios which those banks would have 
observed if depositors had been able to assess their financial positions properly” – that is, if information 
asymmetry did not exist. See ibid 
31   Even if the industries are “different” in some ways, Dowd adds, (“because public policy has made them so”), 
“that still does not tell us that the industries are intrinsically different or that the intervention that makes them 
different is justified.” K Dowd, Laissez Faire Banking 1993 Routledge London at page 1 
32   She does not support complete deregulation of banking. See S Dow, “Why the Banking Industry Should 
BeRegulated?” May 1996 Volume 106 No 436 The Economic Journal at page 705 
33  ibid at pages 700 and 701 
i) Presumed absence of uncertainty of information 
 
Dow  highlights  the  flaws  inherent  in  the  reasoning  adopted  by  many  advocates  of  free 
banking34  and states that the basis of her argument is not to justify the fact that asset values 
can never be predicted, but that the valuations are dependent on uncertain values. 
 
Failure to acknowledge or observe the actual level of uncertainty is of vital significance since 
in Dow’s opinion,  the nature of the demand for money and the propensity for systemic 
instability, as well as the  operational feasibility of a free banking system, are dependent 
thereon.35 
 
Furthermore she adds: 
 
“Free banking proposals rest crucially on the market’s capacity to value bank assets. In the 
absence of state regulation and supervision, it is the market which has the responsibility to 
discipline banks into adopting prudent portfolios. Yet free bankers have not demonstrated that 
the market can actually generate the knowledge required to assess banks’ risks levels.”36 
 
Even though Dow acknowledges that free banking would certainly provide the incentive to 
depositors to acquire more information about banks, she draws attention to concerns which 
relate to whether even information which is regarded as “complete”, under free banking,37  is 
adequate for the correct assessment of risk. 
 
 
 
ii) Difficulty encountered by central bank supervisors in determining whether a bank has 
liquidity or insolvency problems 
 
The alternating shifts between illiquidity and insolvency is acknowledged as having numerous 
consequences – one of which is namely, the fact that, provision of liquidity by a central bank 
to a distressed bank, may allow some of the banks’ creditors to “escape” before insolvency 
actually occurs.38 
 
Another reason put forward by Dow as evidence of the fact that prudential regulation needs to 
be backed up by  the lender of last resort facility,  is attributed to the extreme  difficulty 
encountered by central bank supervisors in determining whether a bank has liquidity problems 
or insolvency problems.39In this context she refers to Davis’ earlier observations and findings 
on issues related to asymmetric information.40   In  highlighting the need for some form of 
assurance  to  depositors  and  the  importance  of  insurance,  she  also  draws  attention  to 
Goodhart’s earlier observations41 that private sector deposit insurers would face 
insurmountable difficulties in gathering adequate  information  on market values and other 
 
34   Dowd for instance, she argues, was able to arrive at the conclusion that banks “can actually detect 
overvaluation of assets” as a result of a presumption of the absence of uncertainty 
35  ibid at page 700 
36  ibid 
37   Freebankers, according to Dow, use the word „knowledge“  advisedly. Instead of a consideration of complete 
or incomplete information, terms such as “ability” to predict market values correctly (even within a probability 
distribution and even in principle) or “probability”are frequently used. Such terms can be regarded as ambigous 
and uncertain. 
38   J Caruana, “The Great Financial Crisis: Lessons For the Design of Central Banks” 2010 Bank for International 
Settlements Publications at page 2 of 9 
39 S Dow, “Why the Banking Industry Should Be Regulated?” May 1996 Volume 106 No 436 The Economic 
Journal at page 701 
40  See EP Davis, Debt, Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk (1992) Oxford: Clarendon. 
financially relevant data and that such task would even prove more difficult for small deposit 
holders. 
 
 
 
 
Other Reasons Why Free Banking May Encounter Problems In Attempting to Foster 
System Stability.  
 
Procyclical Effects 
Even though it could be argued that the regulator or standard setter’s imposition of capital 
adequacy requirements also contributes to pro cyclical effects – as is evidential of Basel II, 
central banks, standard  setters and governments still have vital roles to play in countering 
such pro cyclical effects. The capacity for economic cycles to be aggravated further during 
their peaks (economic booms) or troughs (recessive periods) – given the absence of state or 
central bank supervision and provided that such procyclical effects occur under free banking 
mechanisms, would provide the perfect recipe for systemic instability whose effects could 
trigger immeasurable and potentially damaging consequences. 
 
In establishing monetary policies, central banks (which are responsible for monetary policy as 
well as supervision) would need to know how and when cyclical developments would be 
likely to influence macro prudential policies, which in turn would affect economic prospects.42 
 
The Benston-Kaufman proposal for a modified free banking scheme (whereby there would 
still be a central bank whose purpose would be the supply of adequate liquidity to the banking 
sector,  as  a  means  of  redressing  the  issue  of  system  wide  instability  up  to  a  point),  is 
considered  by  Dow  to  be  the  most  superior  (when  compared  with  other  free  banking 
proposals).43  It is considered by Dow to be more superior to the other free banking proposals 
given the fact that “in a situation of a reversal in expectations about the asset  values, an 
increased supply of liquidity into the system by the central bank, is the best policy for limiting 
the potential for instability.”44 
 
 
 
D. Central Bank Intervention 
 
I. Characteristics and functions of central banks which provide it with unique attributes 
required to address asymmetric information and undertake functions aimed at safeguarding 
system stability include:45 
 
 
 
 
 
41   See also CAE Goodhart, 'Bank insolvency and deposit insurance: a proposal.' In Money and Banking: 
Issues for the Twenty-First Century. (ed. P. Arestis) (1993)London: Macmillan. 
42  See J Caruana, „ The Great Financial Crisis: Lessons for the Design of Central Banks” May 2010 
BISPublications at page 4 of  9 
43   See S Dow, “Why the Banking Industry Should Be Regulated?” May 1996 Volume 106 No 436 
TheEconomic Journal at page 702 
44   Other conditions attached to this proposal by Benston and Kaufman include i) “there would be no direct 
lending of last resort to individual banks and no supervision (supervision is seen as being superseded by risk- 
assessment carried out by competing federal agencies) and ii)it would be up to the inter bank market to decide on 
the terms on which reserves might be borrowed.” Ibid. 
45See J Caruana, „ The Great Financial Crisis: Lessons for the Design of Central Banks” May 2010 BIS 
Publications at pages 2 - 4 
i) Their   key   roles in   overseeing the   inter   bank payments and settlement 
infrastructures  –  since  such  systems  are  fundamental  to  the  modern  financial 
system 
ii) Their unique ability to provide almost unlimited system-wide liquidity at very 
limited notice. In order to perform their roles as lenders of last resort, central banks 
will require more information  about the condition of individual banks before a 
crisis  –  for  example,  knowledge  of  the   levels  of  risk-taking  and  maturity 
transformation  of  some  banks  (which  may  require  broad  information  sharing 
between agencies and the capacity to obtain information directly from  financial 
firms). 
iii) The  considerable  amount  of  resources  which  are  committed  by  central  banks 
towards the analysis of macro economic and financial trends. 
 
 
 
An important reason for advancing the argument that central banks should retain their roles as 
bank supervisors whilst serving as lenders of last resort arrangements therefore relates to the 
extent to which synergies and complementarities exist between monetary policy and financial 
stability – such that it would not only be impracticable, but also extremely difficult to isolate 
these policies from each other.46 
II. Separation of lender of last resort function of central bank from its role as supervisor: 
The separation of the lender of last resort function of the central bank from its role as 
supervisor has the potential to prevent a situation whereby conflicts of interest could occur.47 
Furthermore, where close collaboration exists between a separate supervisory agency and the 
central bank, the existence of such collaboration and links between the supervisory agency 
and the central bank, make it more desirable for a separate agency to undertake supervisory 
functions for purposes of timely, accurate, transfer of information between both authorities. 
Where a central bank has to undertake wider responsibilities aimed at incorporating greater 
macro  stability  based  policies,  the  assumption  of  such  a  role  will  require   greater 
accountability “since functions related to financial stability are by nature, more political than 
monetary policy decisions.”48 
 
Furthermore, Caruana argues that the need to differentiate the central bank’s responsibilities 
from those of the government (since central banks stand in a position where they are nearly 
almost always first in line – when a financial crisis occurs) is not the only issue which arises 
in considering governance  arrangements  required for central banks to fulfil their  role in 
facilitating financial stability.49  “Central banks also need  to have realistic financial stability 
objectives which are consistent with their primary monetary policy responsibilities – as well 
as the powers and instruments to meet such objectives.”50 
 
 
 
 
46  ibid at page 8 of 9 
47See Research Papers (1999) Houses of Parliament Research Paper 99/68 “Financial Services and Markets Bill” 
[ Bill 121 of 1998-99] at page 13; see also C Briault, 'The Rationale for a Single National Services Regulator' 
(1999) Financial Services Authority London Occasional Paper 2 May 1999 at page 28, where arguments in 
favour of a transfer from the central bank to a separate agency include the fact that a situation whereby the 
central bank acts as lender of last resort and sets monetary policies, as well as supervisor, may give rise to 
conflicts of interest. 
48   See J Caruana, „ The Great Financial Crisis: Lessons for the Design of Central Banks” May 2010 BIS 
Publications at page 8 of 9 
49  ibid at page 1 of 9 
50  ibid at pages 1 and 2 
 E. Conclusion 
 
Even though certain merits are to be derived from a system which operates on the basis of free 
banking, the role of central banks and the governments in facilitating system wide stability 
and the inability of free banking to serve as an effective substitute for such a role, adds weight 
to the decision to favour a modified free banking  scheme (whereby there would still be a 
central bank whose purpose would be the supply of adequate liquidity to the banking sector, 
as a means of redressing the issue of system wide instability up to a point). 
 
It would have been ideal if markets could intervene naturally, precisely and promptly when 
banks are confronted with a situation where their reserves are significantly reduced. However 
this, as past crises have revealed, is not the case. Prompt responsiveness is best provided by 
central  banks.  Rather  than  banks  retaining  the  option  not  to  redeem  their  liabilities,  as 
proposed by Dowd,51  the central bank, in certain  situations,52   could “offset the reduction in 
bank reserves with open market operations and the central bank would be held accountable 
for any (if) resulting economic collapse.” It is presumed that in such cases as  the latter 
proposal - where banks are allowed to fail, such banks’ failures are not considered to have 
such systemic importance that they would merit government bail outs. 
 
Even though it has been argued that banks have been able to retain strong capital positions 
when regulation  did not exist, and that historical records reveal that government or central 
bank  intervention  have  actually  contributed  to  financial  instability,  to  concede  to  these 
arguments would imply a lack of consideration of global developments which have occurred – 
particularly over the past three decades. Namely, the rise in conglomeration, more advanced 
information technology and the growth of complex financial products such as derivatives 
whose nature and existence further contribute to problems related to asymmetric information. 
Where conglomerates are involved in complex financial transactions, and such enterprises are 
“too interconnected” or “too big” to fail, then government intervention - as well as central 
bank intervention, may be necessary to prevent a downward spiral of the financial system and 
the entire economy. 
 
The  role  which  regulation  presently  assumes  in  the  financial  system  has  become  more 
formidable because of the increasing prominence of the structure of financial regulation. The 
importance attached to the structure of financial regulation stems principally from the central 
and unique position held by banks – as well as the nature of risks in banking. The adoption of 
the principle of consolidated supervision has enabled supervisors to assess more adequately 
the overall strength of a banking organisation and to monitor its susceptibility to risks based 
on the totality of the business – wherever conducted.53    Such a consolidated  approach to 
regulation  would  also  help  mitigate  risks  and  market  failures  attributed  to  asymmetric 
information. 
 
 
 
 
51   Such option clauses being invoked in the absence of insolvency problems and when there is a reduction in 
bank reserves. See K Dowd, The State and the Monetary System (1989) Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan. 
52   This situation is applicable to where depositors take their funds out of the banking system and where the banks 
in which funds are re deposited kept higher reserve ratios. Benston and Kaufman argue that if depositors were to 
re deposit their funds in other banks and these banks kept reserves at about the same ratio to deposits as did the 
failed banks, there would be no reduction in aggregate money or credit. See GJ Benston and GG Kaufman, „The 
Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation“ Economic Journal Volume 106 at page 693 
53   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, „Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in 
OECD Countries“ (1987) at page 14 
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